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1 Introduction
Since Professor Paul Samuelson showed in his seminal work (Samuelson
(1947, 1952)) that the transfer paradox, i.e., income transfers which enrich
donors and immiserize recipients, cannot take place in two-country Walras-
stable equilibria insofar as there is no distortion, it has been the fundamental
result in the literature of the transfer problem. Starting from the result, the
trade theorists have made considerable contributions by (i) adding the third
country and/or by (ii) incorporating distortions.1
The contributions, however, have been limited to intrinsically static analy-
sis and, except for several articles cited later, the intertemporal aspects of the
transfer problem have not been extensively examined. With international …-
nancial markets recently getting more and more integrated, international
income transfers may well induce variations in interest rates and in asset
prices, thereby bringing about rapid and huge endogenous re-transfers of re-
sources. To incorporate this e¤ect using a dynamic-optimizing model would
help obtain a new insight into the transfer problem.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the transfer problem in a two-
country world economy with in…nitely-lived, heterogeneously habit-forming
consumers. Particularly emphasized is international heterogeneity in habit-
uation to consumption. With the resultant heterogeneity in intertemporal
consumption complementarities, income transfers instantaneously a¤ect the
world interest rate, thereby causing the intertemporal terms of trade e¤ects
on both of the countries. By incorporating the e¤ects, we show that, without
any distortion, the dynamically-stable equilibrium of the two-country world
economy allows income transfers to immiserize the recipient and enrich the
donor.
As a stylized fact, habit formation has been often reported as playing im-
portant roles in determining actual consumer behavior (e.g., Braun, Constan-
tinides, and Ferson (1993), Naik and Moore (1996), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Carrol, Overland, and Weil (2000), and Boldrin, Lawrence, and
Fisher (2001)). However, without no exception, the existing models of con-
1For the literature of (i), see, e.g., Gale (1974), Yano (1983), and Bhagwati, Brecher,
and Hatta (1983). The literature of (ii) contains Brecher and Bhagwati (1982), Bhagwati,
Brecher, and Hatta (1985), and Yano and Nugent (1999). To be precise, the presence
of the third country can be regarded as a distortion insofar as the transferer and the
transferee do not jointly levy the optimal tari¤s against the third country. For this point,
see Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta (1983).
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sumption habits commonly rule out consumers’ interactions due to pecuniary
externalities: they focus on representative agent models (e.g., Ryder and Heal
(1973) and Carrol et al. (2000)) and/or small country models (Mansoorian
(1993) and Ikeda and Gombi (1999)). When the interest rate is endoge-
nously determined in heterogeneous consumer (or country) economies, one’s
consumption-habit behavior would be a¤ected by others’ through interest-
rate adjustments.
To characterize such internationally interactive habit dynamics, we con-
struct a world felicity function from the two countries’ individual felicity func-
tions. It captures pecuniary externalities caused by interest rate adjustments
helps describe the two-country equilibrium easily. Using the approach, the
possibility of the transfer paradox is shown to depend on: (i) international
di¤erences in the degree of habituation; (ii) initial asset distribution; and
(iii) elasticities of intertemporal substitution. In particular, when the debtor
is more habituated to consumption than the creditor, an income transfer
from the creditor to the debtor raises the interest rate in transition through
changes in time preference. With su¢ciently low elasticities of intertempo-
ral substitution and/or su¢ciently large stock of the creditor’s assets, the
resultant intertemporal terms of trade e¤ect immiserizes the recipient and
enriches the donor.
A punch-line of the result is that it is seemingly inconsistent with Samuel-
son’s fundamental result: he claimed that the paradox never occurs in two-
country, free-trade Walras-stable equilibria. To reconcile the two proposi-
tions, we introduce an ad hoc Walras adjustment process, showing that our
transfer paradox also takes place only when the international bond market
is “unstable” with respect to the ad hoc process. By doing it, however,
we do not intend to claim that the transfer paradox is implausible: the
adjustment process is not a rational-expectation equilibrium. The rational-
expectation equilibrium we obtain is dynamically (saddle-point) stable in the
usual sense. Our point is: given that the economy is always in the dynamic
rational expectation equilibrium, the transfer paradox generically occurs at
the neighborhoods of a certain steady state point.
1.1 Comparisons with the literature
There are several important contributions in the dynamic theory of the trans-
fer problem. Among others Epstein (1987) is related most closely to the
present research. In an application of his dynamic general equilibrium model
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with recursive preferences, he predicts that the transfer paradox can occur
under “turnpike stability” (Epstein (1987), footnote 8, p.91). In his model,
time preference, as a source of interest-rate adjustments, is endogenized by
formalizing directly the discount rate as a function of consumption. In our
non-recursive preference model, variations in time preference are generated
endogenously by habit formation, in contrast. Furthermore, he does not
examine how his result can be reconciled to Samuelson’s result.2
Fries (1983) gives an example of the transfer paradox in a two-country,
two-commodity trade model with production uncertainty. The example is
constructed by assuming that equities are internationally-nontraded. On the
contrary, we emphasize the possibility that rapid interest-rate adjustments
in well-organized international capital markets bring about paradoxical in-
tertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ects.
Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) examine the possibility of the transfer
paradox in the overlapping-generation framework. In their paper, dynamic
ine¢ciency arising from the overlapping-generation structure plays a crit-
ical role in producing the paradox. The analysis is, however, limited to
the steady-state e¤ect on welfare, neglecting utility gains and losses on the
transition path. We consider e¢cient equilibria in an in…nitely-lived agent
model, where welfare e¤ects are evaluated by taking into account the entire
time-pro…le of consumption. The punch-line lies in the …nding that without
allocative ine¢ciency, the intertemporal terms of trade e¤ect due to interna-
tional heterogeneity in habits can cause the paradox.
Djaji´c, Lahiri, and Raimondos-Møller (1998) examine the intertempo-
ral terms of trade e¤ect of income transfers by using a two-period model.
Although our attempt is similar to theirs in spirits, they rule out the pos-
sibility of the transfer paradox by adopting a time-additive utility function.
We incorporate time-nonseparability of preferences in the form of consump-
tion habits, which has two e¤ects: First, it brings intrinsic dynamics into
the model. Second, it enables us to endogenize transitional shifting of time
preference, the dynamics of the interest rate, and the intertemporal terms of
trade e¤ect.3
2As a minor di¤erence, in his model the interest rate can adjust only gradually over time
as the aggregate capital stock varies. In our model, in contrast, a transfer instantly a¤ects
the interest rate through the market clearing condition of the “present-good” market.
3After we completed an earlier version of the paper, Professor S. Lahiri kindly sent us
the manuscript of Djaji´c, Lahiri, and Raimondos-Møller (2001). It focuses on consumption
habits through which a temporary foreign aid a¤ects the terms of trade and welfare of
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Our discussion is also related to the literature on the “correspondence
principle” initially proposed by Samuelson (1947): By imposing the stability
conditions on “disequilibrium” dynamics, one can derive “fruitful” results in
comparative statics. The trade theorists including Samuelson himself applied
this principle to rule out the transfer paradox. As pointed out in a critical
survey by Kemp (1987), however, with re-emergence of dynamic theory of
macroeconomics, economists have sought to consider (saddle-point) stability
of intrinsically dynamic stock-‡ow processes by assuming that the economy
is always in dynamic equilibrium. For example, Burmeister and Long (1977)
reasonably proposed a new correspondence principle relating the saddle-point
stability and steady-state properties in dynamic optimization models, show-
ing that some paradoxes can easily survive under the new criterion. Our
result also implies that the transfer paradox cannot be ruled out by the new
correspondence principle.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we present a two-
country model with consumption habits. In Section 3, equilibrium dynamics
are derived and characterized. In Section 4, the e¤ects of transfer payments
are examined, where the possibility of the transfer paradox is shown in the
main proposition. Section 5 discusses the possibilities of immiserizing trans-
fers more explicitly by considering quadratic felicity functions. Section 6
summarizes the paper with concluding remarks.
2 The Two-Country Model
Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and foreign coun-
tries. Each country is populated with in…nitely-lived identical agents. The
representative agents in home and foreign countries are referred to as con-
sumers H and F, respectively. They consume a single consumption good and
hold wealth in the form of bonds. Both the goods and bonds are traded
freely in international markets. For brevity, the representative agents H and
F are assumed to be endowed with constant amounts of output y and y¤, re-
spectively. Throughout the paper, foreign country’s variables are represented
with superscript asterisks.
Consumption forms habits. Letting z(¤)t represent the time-t habit, we
the donor and recipient countries. In contrast to our setting, they introduce distortion by
assuming that there is no international asset trade; assume that habits are externalities;
and consider a two-period model.
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specify z(¤)t as the average of past consumption rates c
(¤)
s ; s · t: z(¤)t =
®
R t
¡1 c
(¤)
s exp (¡® (t¡ s)) ds; or equivalently
_z
(¤)
t = ®
³
c
(¤)
t ¡ z(¤)t
´
; (1)
where _x represents the time derivative of variable x; and ® represents the
discount rate for past consumption rates. We assume that consumers in both
of the countries have the common discount rate ® for past consumption rates.
This enables us to have tractable dynamics of two-country equilibrium.
Consumers H and F have di¤erent preferences over consumption and
habits. Consumer H’s preferences are speci…ed as
U0 =
Z 1
0
u(ct; zt) exp (¡µt) dt; (2)
where µ represents the subjective discount rate, which is assumed constant.
Following Ryder and Heal (1973), function u is assumed to satisfy the follow-
ing regularity conditions: (C1) uc > 0; (C2) uz · 0; (C3) uc (c; c)+uz (c; c) >
0; (C4) u is concave in (c; z) ; (C5) limc!0 uc (c; z) = 1 uniformly in z; and
(C6) limc!0 [uc (c; c) + uz (c; c)] =1: Consumer F’s utility U¤0 is speci…ed in
the same way.
Due to habit formation, consumer preferences are intertemporally depen-
dent. Within the single-agent framework, Ryder and Heal (1973) characterize
the resulting intertemporal complementarities in consumption by adjacent
and distant complementarities: With adjacent complementarity, an increase
in today’s habits increases the marginal utility of today’s consumption more
than it increases marginal disutility of habits, thereby enlarging the today’s
optimal consumption. Under distant complementarity, an increase in today’s
habits increases marginal disutility of habits so much that it reduces today’s
consumption rate. We apply their idea to characterize each country’s sub-
jective or local preferences as follows:
De…nition: Intertemporal consumptions in country H are said to locally
or subjectively display adjacent (distant) complementarity, or simply display
local or subjective adjacent (distant) complementarity, LAC (LDC), if and
only if (i¤) ucz (c; c) + ®µ+2®uzz (c; c) > (<)0: Similarly LAC and LDC for
country F are de…ned by using u¤.4
4Note that we are using term “local” for the meaning of “regional” or “country-speci…c”,
not the mathematical meaning of “neighborhoods”. Likewise we will later use “global” for
the geographical meaning.
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In the case of the single agent economy, these subjective complementari-
ties de…nitely determine the equilibrium dynamics, as seen from the existing
literature (e.g., Ryder and Heal (1973) and Ikeda and Gombi (1999)). In con-
trast, when the economy consists of heterogeneous agents as in the present
case, some pecuniary externalities through markets divert their consumption-
saving behavior from what is predicted from the subjective intertemporal
complementarities, as shown in the next section.
To ensure the steady state, let us assume that
µ = µ¤:
Unlike in the single agent model, however, the interest rate r can deviate
from this subjective discount rate.
Let bt denote net foreign assets held by country H. Given the initial values
(b0; z0) ; consumer H chooses C0 = fct; bt; ztg1t=0 so as to maximize (2) subject
to: (i) the ‡ow budget constraint,
_bt = rtbt + y ¡ ct ¡ ¿t; (3)
where ¿t denotes lump-sum transfer payments from country H to F;5 (ii) the
formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.
Letting ¸t (¸ 0) be the shadow price of savings and »t(· 0) that of habit
formation, the optimal conditions are given by
uc (c; z) = ¸t ¡ ®»t; (4)
_¸
t = (µ ¡ rt)¸t; (5)
_»t = (µ + ®) »t ¡ uz (ct; zt) ; (6)
together with (1), (3), and the transversality conditions for bt and zt:
In exactly the same way, country F’s behavior can be speci…ed. The
model is closed by introducing the market clearing conditions:
ct + c
¤
t = Y (´ y + y¤) ; (7)
bt + b
¤
t = 0: (8)
By the Walras law, these are not independent: (8) together with (3) and the
corresponding constraint for the foreign consumer imply (7). In sum, the
equilibrium time-path of (bt; b¤t ; ct; c
¤
t ; zt; z
¤
t ; rt; ¸t; ¸
¤
t ; »t; »
¤
t ) is determined by
equations (1), (4) through (8), and the transversality conditions for (bt; b¤t ; zt; z
¤
t ).
5Without loss of generality, we assume away the presence of governments in the both
countries since this paper just focuses on the e¤ects of international transfer payments.
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 The world felicity function
In this economy, consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through
international bond markets. To ease the analysis, it is useful to introduce
“aggregate habits” Zt as
Zt ´ zt + z¤t :
Since ® is assumed to be internationally identical, the dynamics of Zt can be
expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (7) as _Zt = ® (ct + c¤t ¡ Zt) =
® (Y ¡ Zt). Since Y is constant throughout the paper, this can be solved as
Zt = Y:
We can thus express z¤t as a function of zt:
6
z¤t = Y ¡ zt: (9)
By using (9), dynamics can be drastically reduced in the following man-
ner. De…ne ¾ as:
¾ =
¸
¸¤
;
which is constant since _¸ t=¸t = _¸
¤
t=¸
¤
t from (5). We then construct aggregate
indices for (u; u¤) and (»; »¤) as:
v (c; z) ´ u (c; z) + ¾u¤ (Y ¡ c; Y ¡ z) ; (10)
& ´ » ¡ ¾»¤; (11)
where (7) and (9) are substituted.
The new felicity function v represents the aggregate utility function with
weights being given by relative individual marginal utilities. We could call it
the world felicity function. The new shadow price & is the weighted di¤erence
in the shadow prices of habits. From the de…nition of v; & could be regarded
as net marginal gains of transferring consumption capital from country F
6When aggregate consumable income Y varies due to …scal policies and/or supply
shocks, Zt evolves over time. For this case, see our companion paper, Ikeda and Gombi
(2001).
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to H. With these de…nitions, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of
consumption habits around a steady state point as follows:
Property 1: In equilibrium, consumer H’s habits around steady state are
governed byµ
_z
_&
¶
=M
µ
z^
&^
¶
; (12)
M =
Ã
¡®
³
1 + vcz
vcc
´
¡ ®2
vcc
(vcz)
2¡vccvzz
vcc
µ + ®(vcc+vcz)
vcc
!
;
where x^ denotes deviations of variable x from its steady-state value ¹x: x^ ´
xt ¡ ¹x.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This property can be easily understood by recalling the second theorem
of public economics. Without any distortion, the Pareto-optimal resource
allocation attained in this equilibrium can be duplicated as a solution to a
social welfare maximization problem:7
max U0 + ¯U
¤
0
subject to Y = ct + c¤t ; Y = zt + z
¤
t ; and _zt = ® (ct ¡ zt) :
Indeed, the corresponding Hamiltonian function,
Ht = u(ct; zt) + ¯u
¤(Y ¡ ct; Y ¡ zt) + &t® (ct ¡ zt) ;
produces the same optimal condition as in Property 1 when weight ¯ is set
equal to ¾:
The dynamic equation (12) for habits is exactly the same as in the case
of the small country model (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi (1999) and Mansoorian
(1996)), except for that v and & represent the world average preferences,
instead of individual consumers’ preferences. In parallel with intertemporal
complementarities with respect to consumers’ individual preferences, we coin
terms to characterize those with respect to the world felicity function:
7The Pareto-optimality is shown in footnote 10.
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De…nition: Intertemporal consumptions are said to globally display distant
(adjacent) complementarity, or simply display global adjacent (distant) com-
plementarity, GAC (GDC), i¤ vcz (c; c) + ®µ+2®vzz (c; c) > (<)0:
From equation (12), we can obtain the characteristic equation: F ($) = 0,
where
F ($) ´ $2 ¡ µ$ ¡ ® (µ + ®)¡ ® (µ + 2®)
vcc
µ
vcz +
®
µ + 2®
vzz
¶
; (13)
which has one stable and one unstable roots. Let ! be the stable root, which
is given in terms of the world felicity function as
! ´
µ ¡
q
(µ + 2®)2 ¡ 4® (µ + 2®)­
2
(< 0) ; (14)
where­ ´ ¡ ¡vcz + ®µ+2®vzz¢ =vcc > (resp. <)0 i¤ GAC (resp. GDC) prevails.
This root speci…es a saddle trajectory for the equilibrium consumption
dynamics. In particular, since
¢
z^t= !z^t on the trajectory, the c^-z^ stable arm
is obtained by substituting it into (1) as
c^t =
µ
! + ®
®
¶
z^t; (15)
which, from the market clearing condition and (9), implies:
c^¤t =
µ
! + ®
®
¶
z^¤t : (16)
From equations (14) through (16), in the case of GAC (vcz (c; c)+ ®µ+2®vzz (c; c) >
0), ! + ® is negative and thus the stable arms (15) and (16) are positively
sloping, whereas under GDC (vcz (c; c) + ®µ+2®vzz (c; c) < 0) the trajectories
have a negative slope with negative ! + ®: These properties can be summa-
rized as follows:
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, both of the countries experience positive
(negative) co-movements between consumption and habits, i.e., dc(¤)t =dz
(¤)
t >
(<) 0; i¤ the world felicity function displays GAC (GDC).
This proposition implies that the equilibrium dynamics in each country
can di¤er from what is predicted by local habit preferences in individual
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countries: For example, even if consumers in country H have the LDC pref-
erence, their consumption positively co-moves with habits in equilibrium if
the world felicity function displays GAC. Note, however, that, for this to be
the case, country F should display strong LAC since the world preference
captured by the world felicity function is an average of the two countries’ lo-
cal preferences. More explicitly, by introducing indices ­H and ­F for local
preferences as
­H = ¡
µ
ucz +
®
µ + 2®
uzz
¶
=ucc and ­F = ¡
µ
u¤cz +
®
µ + 2®
u¤zz
¶
=u¤cc;
where, e.g., ­H > (<)0, LAC (LDC) for H, subjective intertemporal com-
plementarities in individual countries can be related to intertemporal com-
plementarity prevailing globally in equilibrium as follows:
Property 2: Global intertemporal complementarity is a weighted average of
the individual countries’ local intertemporal complementarities in the sense
that:
­ = ²­H + (1¡ ²)­F ;
where: ² = ucc= (ucc + ¾u¤cc).
Therefore, LAC (LDC) in both countries implies GAC (GDC). When the
local intertemporal complementarities di¤er internationally, global intertem-
poral complementarity is determined by their relative strength.
The exact meaning of the local complementarities can be explained as
follows. De…ne characteristic polynomial function FH ($) by replacing the
second order derivatives vcc; vcz; and vzz in (13) with ucc; ucz; and uzz, respec-
tively. FH ($) is a characteristic polynomial function for country H when r
is …xed to µ as if country H were a small country. The characteristic equa-
tion FH ($) = 0 has again one stable and one unstable roots. When !H
represents the stable root, it is given in parallel with (14) as
!H ´
µ ¡
q
(µ + 2®)2 ¡ 4® (µ + 2®)­H
2
(< 0) ;
implying that the sign of !H + ® corresponds to local intertemporal com-
plementarities in country H. The same discussion can be applied to the
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case of country F by introducing the corresponding characteristic equation
FF ($) = 0 and its stable root !F . Local intertemporal complementarities
can be characterized as follows:
Property 3:
!i + ® > (<) 0, LAC (LDC) in country i (i = H;F ).
From the de…nitions of !; !H ; and !F ; ! lies between !H and !F . Root
!H can be either larger or smaller than !F , depending on whether ­H is
larger or smaller than ­F . When !H is larger than !F , consumption adjust-
ment in country H is slower due to stronger habituation to current consump-
tion than in country F. We describe this relationship by using the following
terminology:
De…nition: Country H is said to be more (less) habituated to consumption
than country F i¤ !H > (<)!F and hence i¤ ­H > (<)­F :
3.2 Interest rate dynamics and pecuniary externalities
As shown in Proposition 1, equilibrium consumption dynamics are deter-
mined by globally formed habit preferences, which generally di¤er from local
preferences characterized by Property 3. This discrepancy is caused by pe-
cuniary externalities of interest-rate adjustments, as shown in the next sub-
section. The interest-rate dynamics play an important role in global habit
formation and consumption behavior in each country. As is proven by Ap-
pendix B, the interest rate dynamics can be described by:
r^ = ·
¡
­H ¡­F¢ z^; (17)
where · is de…ned as
· ´ !uccu
¤
cc (µ + 2®)
¸¤ (®+ µ ¡ !) (ucc + ¾u¤cc)
(> 0) :
This reveals that how the interest rate co-moves with habits in country H
depends crucially on the signs of di¤erence ­H ¡­F , and hence on whether
country H is more or less habituated to consumption than country F:
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Property 4: The equilibrium interest rate positively (negatively) co-moves
with country H’s habits i¤ consumption in country H is more (less) habitu-
ated to consumption than in country F: in transition, we have
r (t)¡ µ
z (t)¡ ¹z R 0, !
H R !F (i.e., ­H R ­F ):
Remark: If country H is identical to country F (!H = !F ), or if country F
is small in the sense that ¸¤ is in…nitely large (¸¤ !1), for which case · is
zero, the interest rate dynamics degenerate at µ as in the small country case
(e.g., Ikeda and Gombi (1999))
In the presence of international heterogeneity in the habit preference, the
interest rate r (t) in transition can deviate from µ. For example, suppose
that country H’s preferences display LDC (!H + ® < 0) whereas country F
LAC (!F + ® > 0). Then, !F is larger than !H , so that r (t) negatively co-
moves with z (t). This can be explained intuitively as follows. Without loss
of generality, suppose that z (t) < ¹z, and hence, from (9), z¤ (t) > ¹z¤. With
LDC, country H would consume more now than in the future steady state
if r equaled µ: Country F would also consume more now than in the future
due to LAC, which would give rise to excess demand in the “present good”
market. The market clearing r (t) should thus be higher than its steady state
level µ, as shown in Figure 1. By the same reasoning, in the case of LAC
for country H with LDC prevailing in country F, r (t) is positively correlated
with z (t).
These interest rate adjustments cause pecuniary externalities that divert
consumption dynamics fromwhat is predicted from individual countries’ pref-
erences, as pointed out in Proposition 1. Recall, for example, the case of LDC
for country H with GAC prevailing in equilibrium. When z (t) < ¹z, a higher
r (t) than µ induces country H to consume less now than in the future, so
that c (t) < ¹c; as is predicted by GAC. This takes place when LAC in country
F is dominant. In contrast, if country H is dominant, a larger portion of the
adjustment burden should be owed by country F’s consumption: a higher
r (t) results in a lower c¤ (t) than ¹c¤, leaving c (t) larger than ¹c in country H,
so that GDC prevails re‡ecting H’s LDC.
The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depends on the property
of the world felicity function and international heterogeneity of habits. By
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linearizing (3) and substituting (15) and (17) into the result, we can obtain
b^t =
1
® (µ ¡ !)
©
! + ®¡ ®· ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0ª z^t: (18)
Therefore, whether net foreign assets are positively or negatively correlated
with consumption habits depends on: (i) whether the world felicity function
displays GDC or GAC (the signs of ! + ®); (ii) whether country H is more
or less habituated to consumption than country F (the signs of ­H ¡ ­F );
and (iii) whether country H is initially a net creditor or debtor (the signs of
b0). Note that the last two factors capture the current-account e¤ect of the
interest-rate variation discussed in Property 4.
3.3 Steady state
From (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (18), the steady state equilib-
rium, (¹c; ¹c¤; ¹z; ¹z¤;¹b;¹b¤; ¹¸; ¹»; ¹r), is determined by the following equations:
¹c = ¹z; (19)
¹» =
1
µ + ®
uz (¹c; ¹z) ; (20)
uc (¹c; ¹z) = ¹¸ ¡ ®¹»; (21)
¹r = µ; (22)
¹r¹b+ y = ¹c+ ¿; (23)
¹b¡ b0 = 1
® (µ ¡ !)
©
! + ®¡ ®· ¡­H ¡­F¢ b0ª (¹z ¡ z0) ; (24)
¹z + ¹z¤ = Y; (25)
¹c+ ¹c¤ = Y; (26)
¹b+¹b¤ = 0; (27)
where (19) represents _z = 0 (see (1)); (20) represents _» = 0 ((6)); (21)
comes from the …rst order condition for consumption c (4); (22) represents
_¸ = 0 ((5)); (23) represents _b = 0 ((3)); (24) comes from (18) evaluated at
t = 0; (25) comes from (9); (26) and (27) represent the world market clearing
conditions for the good and bonds ((7) and (8)).
By substituting (19) and (22) into (23), we obtain
µ¹b+ y = ¹z + ¿; (28)
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which, together with (24), determines
¡
¹b; ¹z
¢
. Given this, ¹c is given by (19);
¹» by (20); ¹¸ by (21); ¹z¤ by (25); ¹c¤ by (26); and ¹b¤ by (27). Figure 2 depicts
the determination of
¡
¹b; ¹z
¢
: schedule BB0 depicted with a positive slope
represents (28), whereas schedule SS 0 represents (24).
4 The Transfer Paradox
4.1 The steady-state e¤ect of income transfer
Suppose that country H is a creditor: b0 > 0. Let us consider a permanent
income transfer from the creditor H to the debtor F: d¿ > 0:8 From (19),
(24) and (28), we can obtain
d¹z
d¿
=
d¹c
d¿
=
©
!(®+ µ)¡ ®µ· ¡­H ¡ ­F¢ b0ª¡1 ®(µ ¡ !); (29)
d¹b
d¿
=
1
® (µ ¡ !)
©
! + ®¡ ®· ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0ª d¹zd¿ ;
where it is assumed that !(®+ µ)¡ ®µ· ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0 6= 0 for the existence
of the steady-state equilibrium.
The transfer payments have two e¤ects on country H: a direct e¤ect
! (®+ µ) in (29), due to a decrease in output income, and an indirect ef-
fect represented by ¡®µ· ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0, which is caused by changes in the
interest rate. Steady state habits and consumption in country H are reduced
by the transfer unless the indirect e¤ect is positive and dominant. We can-
not, however, rule out a priori the pathological possibility that the transfer
payments increase the donor’s habits and consumption due to increases in
the interest rate. This causes the transfer paradox, as shown later. The e¤ect
on net foreign assets depends crucially on whether schedule SS 0 upward or
downward sloping.
These adjustments can be illustrated by using Figure 3. An increase in
¿ shifts schedule BB0 upward from B0B00 to B1B
0
1; bringing the steady state
point from E0 to Ea1 , E
b
1, or E
c
1, corresponding to the SS
0 schedule SaS0a; SbS
0
b;
8Permanent transfer payments in the form of d¿ , which are under consideration, is
economically and analytically the same as once-and-for-all transfers db0 of net foreign
assets since international bond markets are perfect.
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or ScS0c.
9 Point Ec1 represents the paradoxical case which we shall focus on
next.
4.2 The main result
Let us now examine the welfare e¤ects of the transfer. First, linearize
the instantaneous utility u around the steady state to obtain: u (ct; zt) =
u (¹c; ¹z)+ucc^t+uz z^t. Next, substituting (15) and z^t = z^0 exp (!t) successively
into this equation yields: u (ct; zt) = u (¹z; ¹z)+
n
uc(!+®)
®
+ uz
o
z^0 exp (!t). By
substituting this into (2), the welfare at time zero is obtained as
U0 =
u (¹z; ¹z)
µ
+
uc (! + ®) =®+ uz
µ ¡ ! (z0 ¡ ¹z) :
From (29), the e¤ect of transfer d¿ (> 0) on donor H’s welfare is thus
given by
dU0
d¿
= ¡!
©¡
1 + µ
®
¢
uc + uz
ª
µ (µ ¡ !)
d¹z
d¿
= ¡ (®+ µ)(®+ µ ¡ !)
®µ (2®+ µ) (1¡ ²) ucc
½
(®+ µ)!
®µ·
¡ ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0¾¡1 ;(30)
whereas, from (9), the e¤ect on recipient F’s welfare is:
dU¤0
d¿
=
!
©¡
1 + µ
®
¢
u¤c + u
¤
z
ª
µ (µ ¡ !)
d¹z
d¿
(31)
=
(®+ µ)(®+ µ ¡ !)
¾®µ (2®+ µ) (1¡ ²) ucc
½
(®+ µ)!
®µ·
¡ ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0¾¡1 :
From the regularity assumption (C3), the …rst equations of (30) and (31)
imply that the sign of the welfare e¤ect is the same as that of d¹z=d¿ for
country H and opposite for country F.10
9The above analysis can be applied to other income shocks with constant aggregate
income. For example, an increase in the subjective discount rate µ shifts the BB0 schedule
upward or downward, depending on whether country H is initially a net debtor or creditor.
Given the direction of the shift, the same analysis as in Figure 3 can be applied.
10Equations (30) and (31) imply:
dU0
d¿
+ ¾
dU¤0
d¿
= 0;
meaning that the equilibrium dynamics we have obtained are indeed Pareto-e¢cient.
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From equations (30) and (31), the necessary and su¢cient condition for
the transfer paradox to occur is given as follows:
Proposition 2: Transfer payments d¿ from country H to F immiserize the
recipient and enrich the donor i¤ (®+ µ)!= (®µ·)>
¡
­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0, i.e.,
(®+ µ) (®+ µ ¡ !) (ucc + ¾u¤cc)¸¤
®µ (2®+ µ) uccu¤cc
>
¡
­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0: (32)
Proposition 2 has the following four implications: First, since b0 is positive
by construction, the proposition implies that a necessary condition for the
transfer paradox to take place is that ­H < ­F : recipient country F is more
habituated to consumption than donor country H: !F > !H .
Second, the interest rate adjustment re‡ecting this habit heterogeneity
induces the intertemporal terms of trade e¤ect, thereby causing the transfer
paradox. To see this, obtain from equation (17) and (30)
dr (0)
d¿
= ¡
½
(®+ µ)!
®µ·
¡ ¡­H ¡­F¢ b0¾¡1 (µ ¡ !) ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢
µ
:
The transfer paradox thus takes place only when the interest rate instanta-
neously jumps up, and hence only when the intertemporal terms of trade for
the recipient deteriorates discretely.11 More speci…cally, when ­H < ­F , we
can easily show that whenever the interest rate r (0) goes up, the disposable
income y + rb¡ ¿ for the donor initially increases: dd¿ fb0r (0)¡ ¿g > 0:12 It
follows that the transfer payments bene…ts the donor only when the percent-
age rate of the initial rise in the interest rate is higher than the percentage
rate of the initial decrease in the total wealth b0 ¡ ¿=r¤ :
dr (0)
¹r
>
(d¿) =¹r
b0
:
11Conversely, given that recipient country F is more habituated to consumption than
donor country H, the interest rate instantaneously jumps up only when the transfer para-
dox occurs.
12We have b0dr(0)d¿ ¡ 1 > 0 if and only if
! (®+ µ) > ®·b0min
©
µ
¡
­H ¡­F ¢ ; ! ¡­H ¡­F ¢ª :
Given that ­H < ­F , this is equivalent to (32).
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This situation is somewhat similar to the “debt-relief La¤er curve” e¤ect
discussed by Krugman (1989): by using a tentative model, he points out
the possibility that debt forgiveness actually increases expected payment on
the wrong side of the “debt-relief La¤er curve”. The discussion above shows
that this kind of the La¤er-curve e¤ect can be consistent with consumers’
dynamic utility maximizing behavior.13
Third, roughly speaking, given that recipient F is more habituated to
consumption than H, the larger the initial net foreign assets b0 held by donor
H, the more likely the paradox takes place. This is because a large b0 ex-
aggerates the perverse terms-of-trade e¤ect. This statement is too rough,
however, since an (exogenous) increase in b0 may well a¤ect the initial equi-
librium resource allocation and hence the other parts of (32). A precise
implication of b0 is as follows. Let I
(¤)
0 denote the initial steady-state GNP:
I
(¤)
0 = µb
(¤)
0 + y
(¤), where note that I0 + I¤0 = Y and I
(¤)
0 = z
(¤)
0 : Suppose now
that
(®+ µ) (®+ µ ¡ !) (ucc + ¾u¤cc)¸¤
®µ (2®+ µ) uccu¤cc
>
¡
­H ¡ ­F ¢ z0
µ
: (33)
Then, for given (I0; I¤0 ), and hence for given (z0; z
¤
0), the larger b0; the more
likely the transfer paradox takes place.14
Fourth, (32) depends on the marginal felicities ui and u¤i (i = c; z) only
through ¸¤
¡
= u¤c +
®
®+µ
u¤z
¢
and ¾
¡
= ¸
¸¤ =
¡
uc +
®
®+µ
uz
¢
=
¡
u¤c +
®
®+µ
u¤z
¢¢
:Note
here that, as seen from the Euler equation (41) in Appendix B,¡¸(¤)=
³
c(¤)u(¤)cc
´
represent the elasticities of intertemporal substitution. Condition (32) thus
implies the following: Suppose that recipient F is more habituated to con-
sumption than donor H. Then, for given
¡
uij ; u
¤
ij ; ®; µ; ¾; b0
¢
(i; j = c; z), the
smaller ¸ and ¸¤; and hence the smaller the elasticities of intertemporal sub-
stitution, the more likely the paradox occurs. This is natural again since
small elasticities of intertemporal substitution enlarge a response in the in-
terest rate.15
13In Krugman (1989), the “debt-relief La¤er curve” e¤ect takes place when debt for-
giveness a¤ects the probability distribution of the nature in favor of the “good” state. The
e¤ect is thus Pareto-improving: it is also bene…cial to the debtor. In the present model,
in contrast, equilibrium is always Pareto e¢cient, so that the “debt-relief La¤er curve”
e¤ect is de…nitely harmful to the debtor.
14Inequality (33) is necessary because b0 cannot exceed z0=µ:
15From the same discussion, we can choose a set of parameter sets such that (32) holds
by choosing the …rst derivatives (uc;¡uz; u¤c ;¡u¤z) arbitrarily small, with keeping ¾ and
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All these discussions can be summarized as follows:
Corollary:
1. The transfer paradox takes place only when recipient country F is more
habituated to consumption than donor country H.
2. The transfer paradox takes place only when the interest rate initially
jumps up, thereby increasing the total wealth of the donor.
3. Suppose that recipient F is more habituated to consumption than donor
H. Then, the possibility of the paradox can be characterized as follows:
(a) For given GNPs (I0; I¤0 ) of the two countries, the larger the net
foreign assets b0 held by the donor ; the more likely the transfer
paradox occurs if (33) is met.
(b) For given
¡
uij; u
¤
ij ; ®; µ; ¾; b0
¢
(i; j = c; z), the smaller the elas-
ticities of intertemporal substitution, the more likely the paradox
occurs.
4.3 The trick: relation to Samuelson
A striking aspect of Proposition 2 is that it appears to be inconsistent with
Samuelson’s fundamental result: we have shown that the transfer paradox
can occur even in a locally-stable, two-country equilibrium without any dis-
tortion.
The trick lies in a di¤erence in the stability concept: The fundamental
theorem requires the Walrasian stability, i.e., stability with respect to the
Walrasian adjustment process, whereas the dynamics of our model are stable
in the usual sense that the relevant characteristic root !, which characterizes
the equilibrium dynamics of the economy, is negative.
To see this, let us consider an ad hoc Walrasian adjustment process for
the time-zero international bond market as follows. Solve equation (24) for
b0 and eliminate ¹b and ¹z from the resulting equation by using (28) and (17),
respectively, where (17) is evaluated at t = +0. The resultant equation,
where b0 is expressed as a function of the time-zero interest rate r0, could be
the other parameters constant. This point is discussed more explicitly in Section 5.2.
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regarded as a demand function for b0. Letting D (r0) represent the demand
function, it is given by
D (r0) ´
! (µ + ®)¡ ®µ· ¡­H ¡­F¢ b0
®µ· (­H ¡ ­F ) (µ ¡ !) (r0 ¡ µ)¡
y ¡ z0 ¡ ¿
µ
:
As in the usual rational-expectation models, we have so far implicitly
assumed that the international bond market is instantaneously cleared by r0
such that the demand D (r0) equals the existing stock b0. Instead, imagine
for exposition that the market can be cleared only “sluggishly” according to:
dr0(s)
ds
= k (b0 ¡D (r0(s))) ; (34)
where s represents some imaginary time; and k (> 0) is the adjustment speed.
Equation (34) represents an imaginary Walrasian adjustment process where
the interest rate rises “sluggishly” depending on the excess supply of the
bond stock. With this process, the market could be said to be Walras-stable
i¤
(D0 (r0) =)
! (µ + ®)¡ ®µ· ¡­H ¡ ­F ¢ b0
®µ· (­H ¡­F ) (µ ¡ !) > 0: (35)
From this observation, we can show that the Walrasian instability is a nec-
essary condition for the transfer paradox to occur:
Proposition 3: The transfer paradox takes place only if the international
bond market at time zero is Walras-unstable with respect to the ad hoc Wal-
rasian adjustment process given by (34).
Proof. Suppose that inequality (32) holds true. This implies (i) the nu-
merator of (35) is positive; and (ii) ­H ¡ ­F < 0; which together imply
D0 (r0) < 0:
We do not put Proposition 3 to show that the transfer paradox is unlikely
to occur, but to show the consistency of our result to Samuelson’s. Unlike
in his (and other trade theorists’) intrinsically-static models, however, we
incorporate dynamics in a natural way by considering consumers’ optimal
saving behavior, showing that the steady state equilibria are locally saddle-
point stable. Given the modelling, stability should reasonably be discussed
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from the viewpoint of the equilibrium dynamics, as proposed by Burmeis-
ter and Long (1977). The local stability implies that the transfer paradox
generically occurs at the neighborhoods of the corresponding steady state
point. Epstein (1987) and Haaparanta (1989) also found that the transfer
paradox is compatible with saddle-point stability of equilibrium dynamics.16
All these results imply that, given that the economy is always in a dynamic
rational-expectation equilibrium, the transfer paradox cannot be ruled out
by the stability argument.17
5 Example: The case of quadratic felicity functions
5.1 Quadratic felicity functions
To discuss more explicitly the possibilities of the transfer paradox, let us
construct a simple example by using quadratic felicity functions, as in Becker
and Murphy (1988) and Obstfeld (1992):
u(¤)
¡
c(¤); z(¤)
¢
= Á(¤)c c
(¤)¡Á(¤)z z(¤)+Á(¤)cz c(¤)z(¤)¡Á(¤)cc
c(¤)2
2
¡Á(¤)zz
z(¤)2
2
;(36)
for which case the partial derivatives of u(¤)
¡
c(¤); z(¤)
¢
evaluated at the initial
steady state are given by
u(¤)c = Á
(¤)
c ¡
¡
Á(¤)cc ¡ Á(¤)cz
¢
z
(¤)
0 ;
u(¤)z = ¡
n
Á(¤)z ¡
¡
Á(¤)cz ¡ Á(¤)zz
¢
z
(¤)
0
o
;
u(¤)cc = ¡Á(¤)cc ; u(¤)cz = Á(¤)cz ; u(¤)zz = ¡Á(¤)zz :
For the regularity conditions to be satis…ed, we restrict the values of para-
meters Á(¤)i and Á
(¤)
ij as follows:
1. Á(¤)c > 0; Á
(¤)
z > 0; Á
(¤)
cc > 0; Á
(¤)
zz > 0; Á
(¤)
cz T 0;
16However, Epstein (1987) and Haaparanta (1989) do not elucidate how their results
can be consistent with Samuelson’s …nding. We can show that Epstein’s transfer paradox
also takes place only when the international capital market is unstable with respect to an
adhoc Walrasian adjustment process.
17We do not intend to say that any “disequilibrium” dynamics are meaningless. Our
point is that the stability arguments based on ad hoc adjustment processes such as the
Walrasian process could not be a strong reason for ruling out a priori the possibilities of
the transfer paradox or other phenomena derived from rational agent models.
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2. Á(¤)c ¡
³
Á
(¤)
cc ¡ Á(¤)cz
´
z
(¤)
0 > 0; Á
(¤)
z ¡
³
Á
(¤)
cz ¡ Á(¤)zz
´
z
(¤)
0 > 0 for u
(¤)
c > 0
and u(¤)z < 0;
3. Á(¤)c ¡
³
Á
(¤)
cc ¡ Á(¤)cz
´
z
(¤)
0 ¡
n
Á
(¤)
z ¡
³
Á
(¤)
cz ¡ Á(¤)zz
´
z
(¤)
0
o
= Á
(¤)
c ¡ Á(¤)z ¡³
Á
(¤)
cc ¡ 2Á(¤)cz + Á(¤)zz
´
z
(¤)
0 > 0 for u
(¤)
c + u
(¤)
z > 0; and
4. Á(¤)cc Á
(¤)
zz ¡ Á(¤)2cz > 0 for concavity.
5.2 Possibilities of the transfer paradox
By using the felicity functions, we shall show that there actually exist para-
meter values that allow the transfer paradox. With felicity functions (36),
the necessary and su¢cient condition (32) for the paradox to occur reduces
to
¡(®+ µ) (®+ µ ¡ !)
®µ (2®+ µ)
Ácc + ¾Á
¤
cc
ÁccÁ¤cc
¸¤ >
¡
­H ¡­F¢ b0; (37)
where
¸¤
µ
´ u¤c +
®
µ + ®
u¤z
¶
= Á¤c ¡ (Á¤cc ¡ Á¤cz) z¤0 ¡
®
®+ µ
fÁ¤z ¡ (Á¤cz ¡ Á¤zz) z¤0g ;
¾
µ
´ ¸
¸¤
¶
=
Ác ¡ (Ácc ¡ Ácz) z0 ¡ ®®+µ fÁz ¡ (Ácz ¡ Ázz) z0g
Á¤c ¡ (Á¤cc ¡ Á¤cz) z¤0 ¡ ®®+µ fÁ¤z ¡ (Á¤cz ¡ Á¤zz) z¤0g
; (38)
­H =
µ
Ácz ¡ ®
µ + 2®
Ázz
¶
=Ácc;­F =
µ
Á¤cz ¡
®
µ + 2®
Á¤zz
¶
=Á¤cc:
Start with choosing parameter values satisfying the regularity conditions,
such that:
² (a) country F is more habituated to consumption than H: ­F > ­H ;
² (b) country H is initially a creditor: b0 > 0;
² (c) Á(¤)cc ¡ Á(¤)cz > 0; Á(¤)cz ¡ Á(¤)zz > 0:
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From two properties (a) and (b), the right hand side of inequality (37) is
negative. Since our purpose in this subsection is to verify the possibility of
the paradox, we should start with some parameter set under which the right
hand side of inequality (37) is larger than the left hand side.
But note that, by choosing (Ác; Áz; Á¤c ; Á
¤
z) appropriately, we can make the
values of u(¤)c and u
(¤)
z and hence ¸¤ arbitrarily close to zero, with …xing the
value of ¾ and other components of (37) at the values initially chosen. That
is, we can take limits of ¸¤ # +0 by taking limits of (uc;¡uz; u¤c ;¡u¤z) # +0,
which, in turn, can be taken, with keeping ¾ constant, by considering the
limit:
(Ác; Áz; Á
¤
c ; Á
¤
z) # ((Ácc ¡ Ácz) z0; (Ácz ¡ Ázz) z0; (Á¤cc ¡ Á¤cz) z¤0 ; (Á¤cz ¡ Á¤zz) z¤0) ;(39)
which is positive from condition (c). For any (®; µ; Á(¤)cc ; Á
(¤)
cz ; Á
(¤)
zz ; z0; z
¤
0 ; b0)
that satis…es the regularity conditions and conditions (a) though (c) above,
this means that there always exists a continuum of the values for (Ác; Áz; Á¤c ; Á
¤
z)
and hence for ¸¤ that validates inequality (37).
For example, limit (39) proposed above can be conducted as follows.
First, for a given regular value of
³
®; µ; Á
(¤)
cc ; Á
(¤)
cz ; Á
(¤)
zz ; z0; z
¤
0 ; b0
´
, construct
(Ác; Áz; Á
¤
c ; Á
¤
z) as
Ác = (Ácc ¡ Ácz) z0 + "c;
Áz = (Ácz ¡ Ázz) z0 + "z;
Á¤c = (Á
¤
cc ¡ Á¤cz) z¤0 + "¤c ;
Á¤z = (Á
¤
cz ¡ Á¤zz) z¤0 + "¤z;
where the "(¤)i ’s are positive parameters. Let k and n be constant parameters
such that 0 < k < ®+µ
®
and n > 0. Then, by setting the "(¤)i ’s as
"z = k"c; "
¤
c =
1
n
"c; and "¤z =
k
n
"c; (40)
we obtain from (38)
¾ = n;
which is a positive constant by construction, irrespective of the "(¤)i ’s values.
From (40), by taking limit "c ! 0, we can thus take limit (39) and hence ¸¤ #
+0, with keeping ¾ and other components appearing in (37) constant. (Note:
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Components in (37) other than (¸¤; ¾) do not depend on (Ác; Áz; Á¤c ; Á
¤
z) and
hence on the "(¤)i ’s.) In this way, by choosing an arbitrarily small "c, we make
the absolute value of the left hand side of (37) arbitrarily small, with keeping
the right hand side constant.
5.3 Numerical examples
In view of (37), let us now de…ne the paradox indicator function as:
TPX (®; µ; Ác; Áz; Ácc; Ácz; Ázz; Á
¤
c ; Á
¤
z; Á
¤
cc; Á
¤
cz; Á
¤
zz; z0; z
¤
0 ; b0)
= ¡(®+ µ) (®+ µ ¡ !)
®µ (2®+ µ)
Ácc + ¾Á
¤
cc
ÁccÁ¤cc
¸¤ ¡ (­H ¡ ­F ) b0½
> 0 for the paradox case,
· 0 for the normal case.
For the reference case, we consider the parameter set listed in Table 1
which satis…es all the regularity conditions and conditions (a)-(c):
® µ Ác Áz Ácc Ácz Ázz Á
¤
c Á
¤
z Á
¤
cc Á
¤
cz Á
¤
zz z0 z
¤
0 b0
1 1 15.2 0.1 16 1 1 8.7 0.6 10 1.5 1 1 1 0.4
Table 1: Reference Parameter Values
With these parameter values, the following properties are valid:
1. We have ­H = 4:1667£ 10¡2 and ­F = 0:11667, implying that ­F >
­H > 0; and hence !F > !H , that is country F is more habituated to
consumption. This is a necessary condition for the transfer paradox to
occur.
2. The stable root amounts to: ! = ¡0:92775; so that GAC prevails since
! + ® > 0:
3. ¸ = ¸¤ = 0:15 and the weight applied to country F’s felicity in con-
structing function v is also unity: ¾ = 1.
4. However, the transfer paradox does not take place in the reference case
since TPX = ¡1:7576£ 10¡2 < 0:
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As shown in Corollary, the transfer paradox likely occurs under a large
b0:We can obtain the critical value ¯ for b0 required for the transfer paradox
to occur under the reference case by solving:
TPX (1; 1; 15:2; 0:1; 16; 1; 1; 8:7; 0:6; 10; 1:5; 1; 1; 1; ¯) = 0:
This can be computed to obtain ¯ ' 0:64, which is smaller than z0=µ = 1.
Therefore, if b0 is larger 0:64, transfer payments immiserize the recipient,
insofar as b0 < 1: In fact, for example, when b0 = 0:7; TPX amounts to
4:92£ 10¡3, implying the paradox.
Let us next check item 3(b) in Corollary by examining the e¤ect of changes
in (Á¤c ; Á
¤
z). Under the reference values for the other parameters, (Á
¤
c ; Á
¤
z)
should satisfy Á¤c > 8:5; Á
¤
z > 0:5;Á
¤
c ¡ Á¤z > 8:0 to meet the regularity condi-
tions. A small Á¤c ¡ Á¤z ¡ 8:0 implies a small ¸¤ and hence a small elasticity
of intertemporal substitution of country F, where the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution is given by ¸¤=Á¤cc = ¸
¤=10 in the reference case. Table 2
summarizes the relationship among (Á¤c ; Á
¤
z), elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS) ¸¤=Á¤cc, and ¯. In the reference case (Á
¤
c ; Á
¤
z) = (8:7; 0:6) ; EIS
amounts to 0:015, and a b0 larger than 0:64 results in the paradox. As is
expected, in case 1, in which EIS is much smaller than in the reference case,
the paradox can occur for a smaller b0 (¯ = 0:25). In contrast, in case 2, EIS
equals 0:028, so that the paradox unlikely takes place since ¯ is almost equal
to one. In case 3, EIS is too large for the paradox to occur.18
(Á¤c ; Á
¤
z) EIS (¸
¤=Á¤cc) b0 for the paradox (¯)
reference case (8:7; 0:6) 0:015 0:64
case 1 (8:51; 0:509) 0:0006 0:25
case 2 (8:93; 0:8) 0:028 0:98
case 3 (9; 1) 0:125 ;
Table 2: Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution, External Assets, and the
Possibility of the Transfer Paradox.
18To be precise, these results are more than predicted by the analytical result 3(b) in
Corollary. When we compute the results in Table 2, all the e¤ects on parameters ¾ and !
are incoporated, whereas in statement 3(b) in Corollary, we …x these parameters.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the transfer problem by using a one-good two-country
model with in…nitely-lived, heterogeneously habit-forming consumers. Due
to pecuniary externalities through endogenous interest-rate adjustments, the
equilibrium consumption-habit dynamics are characterized by a world felicity
function constructed from the individual countries’ felicity functions, which
determines intertemporal consumption-complementarities prevailing in the
two-country equilibrium. International transfer payments can harm the re-
cipient and bene…t the donor, depending on: (i) international heterogeneity
in the preference for habits; (ii) initial asset distribution; and (iii) intertem-
poral consumption-complementarities in the world. In particular, when the
debtor is more habituated to consumption than the creditor, transfer from the
creditor to the debtor raises the interest rate in transition through changes in
time preference. This intertemporal terms of trade e¤ect causes the paradox.
Our result implies that the transfer paradox cannot be ruled out by
the stability argument, given that the economy is always in the rational-
expectation dynamic equilibrium. We never intend to say that any “dis-
equilibrium” analysis is meaningless; rather it must be examined whether
the paradoxical result can still survive when stable adjustment processes in
market disequilibrium are properly modeled from the micro-founded rational
behavior of economic agents. It must be an important research topic in the
future.
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Appendices
A Proof of Property 1
Note …rst that ¸=¸¤ which is constant because _¸ t=¸t = _¸
¤
t=¸
¤
t from (5). By
eliminating c¤ and z¤ using (7) and (9) from the foreign counterpart of (4),
combining the resultant equation and (4) yields
uc (c; z) + ®»
u¤c (Y ¡ c; Y ¡ z) + ®»¤
=
¸
¸¤
= constant.
By totally di¤erentiating this, we can obtain
c^ = ¡¸
¤ucz + ¸u¤cz
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
z^ ¡ ®¸
¤
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^ +
®¸
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^
¤
:
Substitute this equation into (1), (6), and the foreign counterpart of (6) and
eliminate c¤ and z¤ using (7) and (9) from the resulting equation. Then,
we can derive the autonomous dynamic equation system with respect to³
z^; »^; »^
¤´
as
_z = ¡®
µ
¸¤ucz + ¸u¤cz
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
+ 1
¶
z^ ¡ ®
2¸¤
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^ +
®2¸
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^
¤
;
_» =
½
ucz (¸
¤ucz + ¸u¤cz)
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
¡ uzz
¾
z^ +
µ
µ + ®+
®ucz¸
¤
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
¶
»^ ¡ ®ucz¸
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^
¤
;
_»
¤
= ¡
½
u¤cz (¸
¤ucz + ¸u¤cz)
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
¡ u¤zz
¾
z^ ¡ ®u
¤
cz¸
¤
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
»^ +
µ
µ + ®+
®u¤cz¸
¤
¸¤ucc + ¸u¤cc
¶
»^
¤
:
From the de…nitions (10) and (11) of v and & , respectively, this autonomous
system can be reduced to (12).
B Derivation of (17)
From (4), local consumption dynamics can be expressed using time preference
½ ´ ¡ d ln(uc(c;z)+®»)dt
¯¯¯
_c=0
as
_c = ¡ ¸
ucc
(r^ ¡ ½^) ; (41)
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where
½^ =
® (uzz + ucz)
¸
z^ ¡ ® (µ + ®)
¸
»^:
Since _c = !c^; (15) implies
_c = !
µ
! + ®
®
¶
z^:
Substituting the last two equations into (41), we obtain:
r^ =
¡ucc! (! + ®) + ®2 (uzz + ucz)
®¸
z^ ¡ ® (µ + ®)
¸
»^: (42)
To eliminate »^ from the above, substitute _» = !»^ and (15) into (6) to
obtain
»^ =
(! + ®) ucz + ®uzz
® (µ + ®¡ !) z^:
By substituting this equation into (42), we can obtain (17).
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Figure 1.  Equilibrium relationship between r and z:  
The case of Fω  > Hω . 
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Figure 2.  Steady state equilibrium:  
The case of 
θ
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Figure 3.  The effects of income transfers. 
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